(9) Rorty's "interesting philosophy"

Praxis-oriented research in whatever guise (as research, reflection, inquiry, exploration, experimentation) involves a shift beyond the forms of research that seek objectivity from the researcher. This is points to a celebration of forms of research that locate researchers in a subjective spaces where they are deeply implicated in the actions and theories that are the focus of research. My thesis argues that these forms of research require a different vocabulary from more objective forms of inquiry.

This scrambling for recognition and space to grow does not reject the value of other forms of research which seek objective forms of knowledge. However there is competition for power in the forms of funding and status - so the waters are murky - there is political resistance to fresh forms of research.

To further complicate matters, the tools of investigation (quantitative and qualitative methods of data gathering and analysis) are important tools in subjective forms of research.

So, I guess from this that my thesis is about describing things in new ways so that new ways of thinking are fostered.

The method I foster is described by Richard Rorty (an American pragmatist) who suggest that new ways of thinking happen when you "describe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have created a pattern of linguistic behaviour which will tempt the rising generation to adopt it, thereby causing them to look for appropriate new forms of non-linguistic behaviour, for example, the adoption of new scientific equipment or new social institutions." Exhibit 1.2.1 is from my thesis.

----------------
Exhibit 1.2.1 Rorty’s “interesting philosophy”
----------------
On the view of philosophy which I am offering, philosophers should not be asked for arguments against, for example, the correspondence theory of truth or the idea of the “intrinsic nature of reality.” The trouble with arguments against the use of a familiar and time-honoured vocabulary is that they are expected to be phrased in that very vocabulary. … Interesting philosophy is rarely an examination of the pros and cons of a thesis. Usually it is, implicitly or explicitly, a contest between an entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely offers new things.

The latter “method” of philosophy is the same as the “method” of utopian politics or revolutionary science (as opposed to parliamentary politics or normal science). The method is to describe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have created a pattern of linguistic behaviour which will tempt the rising generation to adopt it, thereby causing them to look for appropriate new forms of non-linguistic behaviour, for example, the adoption of new scientific equipment or new social institutions. This sort of philosophy does not work piece by piece, analysing concept after concept, or testing thesis after thesis. Rather it works holistically and pragmatically. It says things like “try thinking of it this way” - or more specifically, “try to ignore the apparently futile traditional questions by substituting the following new and possibly interesting questions.” (Rorty, 1989: 8-9, italics added)
----------------

I wonder how the method Rorty describes (which is a philosophical approach) sits alongside my use of method in the earlier paragraph (quant and qual methods of gathering and analysing data) ...